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The resource curse literature has necessarily evolved in a rather fragmented way. While economists,
political economists and political scientists have largely focused on the role of mineral abundance in
long-term growth with the analysis largely confined to the country (macro) or regional (meso) level,
anthropologists, sociologists and other social scientists have explored the development impacts of
extractive industries at the community (micro) level. While this has provided a rigorous and
comprehensive exploration of extractive industries and their impacts, causal factors that bridge and/or
leap-frog these levels tend not to be accounted for. In this paper we examine the evolution of the
literature across disciplinary lines and different levels of scale to assess the current status of resource
curse debates. In so doing, we aim to explore how an integration of the various multi-scale approaches
can help address the persistent problem of the resource curse.
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The interest of the scientific community in the ‘resource curse’
(i.e. the tendency of mineral rich economies to underperform in
economic growth and other development outcomes) has critically
evolved over the last two decades. A Google Scholar search shows
E. Gilberthorpe, E. Papyrakis / The Extractive Industries and Society 2 (2015) 381–390382that while there were only 13 scientific papers that referred to the
so-called ‘resource curse’ in 1995, the number increased to 67 in
2000, 543 in 2005, 1890 in 2010 and 2420 in 2014. This level of
academic focus combined with greater awareness through media
reporting, civil action and improved outlets for dispute by
indigenous populations and social movements, has led to better
monitoring and regulation at the global level. Voluntary initiatives,
such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and
the Global Mining Initiative, are just two of many examples that
indicate how scientific research has influenced policy circles; yet,
after 20 years of research and action, ‘the curse’ lingers as a very
real global problem.
Identification within academic circles that something was
drastically wrong with mineral-based development2 followed the
influential World Bank-funded study conducted by Gelb et al.
(1988). The term ‘resource curse’ was itself first coined by
Professor Richard Auty in 1993 in his seminal book, Sustaining
Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (Auty,
1993). The response to these major studies saw a natural evolution
of research on the extractive industries within economic and
political spheres. In other disciplines a focus on the ‘resource
curse’, which is, by definition and application, an economic theory
and tool, was far slower and is, as a result, far smaller. Economic
theory does not always translate well to other social sciences.
Application of ‘the resource curse’ to understand complex and
diverse localised social, political and economic conditions, as well
as nuanced factors such as local accounts of the impacts of
extractive industries, diverse processes of extraction, and the
nature of the mineral itself have been found to be severely limiting
in the social sciences (see especially Weszkalnys, 2011; also Lahiri-
Dutt, 2006; Reyna and Behrends, 2008). For more micro-level
scientific researchers, the ‘resource curse’ was a macro-level
problem, and the impacts of extractive industries at the local/
village/community level were, and are, examined in terms of social
change and problems linked to processes of sustainable develop-
ment.
Consequently, the multidisciplinary concern with the impact of
extractives rarely translates into interdisciplinary research (for
exceptions see Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington, 2010;
Bebbington and Bebbington, 2011; Bebbington and Bury, 2009
and Berdegue´a et al., 2015 – these are some of the few attempts to
provide a more holistic picture of the resource curse by looking at
the community-extractive industries-government nexuses at
different scales, particularly in the Latin American context). There
are many reasons for this, but methodological diversity is key.
Disciplines work in very different ways. Taking the two disciplin-
ary extremes examined in this paper as an example, while an
economist identifies a question and seeks to answer it, an
anthropologist pursues questions to find meaning rather than
provide answers. When a concern for the economic implications of
‘the curse’ emerged within policy circles in the 1980s, economists
and political economists were the obvious choice for aiding policy
development because their disciplinary methods provide quanti-
tative data that can be understood and linked to clear action points.
A broad examination of the vast literature on the resource curse,
however, shows that while the mainstream economics and
political economy literature (the micro, and the meso) provides
invaluable insight into extractive industries, the micro level
analyses that have followed provide a nuanced examination of
its effects that is equally valuable. Combined, they can provide a2 Mineral economies are defined as developing countries that generate ‘at least
8% of their GDP and 40% of their export earnings from the mineral sector’ (Auty,
1993: 3). They make up approximately one-fifth of developing countries (Auty and
Mikesell, 1999).much more comprehensive view of extractive industries and its
impacts as fabricated at the global and the local level.
Our aim in this paper is to examine the ways in which different
disciplinary focuses have shaped the resource curse literature.
Moreover, we aim to examine disciplinary boundaries and the
fragmentation of the resource curse debates across different levels
of scale. The objective here is to show how these levels and the
different disciplines that inhabit them, are critical to understand-
ing the factors determining the resource curse for future policy
development. As such, this paper is first and foremost a review of
the resource literature. It also, however, identifies important
linkages between an apparently disparate literature that could
have a very real impact on defeating ‘the curse’. This paper
contributes to the literature by providing a first attempt at bridging
the different fragments of research on the resource curse, which
have been largely determined across disciplinary lines and across
different levels of scale. To our knowledge this is the first dedicated
endeavour to provide such a holistic framework under which the
resource curse phenomenon should be analysed.
In Section 2 of the paper we discuss in more detail how the
different streams of the resource curse literature have evolved
separately. In particular, we pay special attention to the
qualitatively different types of findings across these fragments
of the resource curse literature. In Sections 3–7, we reflect on the
implications of this fragmentation for the scientific analysis on
development impacts in mineral rich countries, as well as for
appropriate policy-making at various scales.
2. The fragmentation of the resource curse literature
In this section we elaborate further on the fragmentation of the
resource curse literature with respect to scale, as well as
methodology and policy focus. Although there are naturally no
strict demarcation lines, we try to establish some general patterns
based on our observation of the divergent approaches that have
been adopted so far. First we discuss the fragmentation of the
literature with respect to the geographic level of analysis (macro-
country level, meso-subnational level, micro-community level), as
well as the types of impacts and mechanisms considered (e.g.
economic, institutional, etc.). Then we proceed to discuss
fragmentation along other lines, such as the type of methodologi-
cal approach and the link to different policy questions over time
vis-a`-vis the mineral sector.
The discussion that follows has greatly benefited from earlier
review articles on the resource curse that have summarised
theories and empirical evidence linking the extractive industries
(and natural resources more broadly) with several development
outcomes. One of the earliest reviews of the literature (focusing
primarily on political economy explanations of the resource curse)
is the one conducted by Ross (1999). Two other early review papers
by Gylfason (2001b) and Stevens (2003) primarily focused on the
economic explanations of the curse. A subsequent review by
Andrew Rosser (2009) critically reflected on the resource curse
literature by devoting a separate discussion to the causes,
consequences and remedies of the curse. Frankel (2010) provided
a more comprehensive review of the economics literature on the
resource curse, paying particular attention to the robustness of the
empirical evidence. Ross (2014) recently provided a detailed
overview of the literature on institutional explanations (theory and
evidence) of the resource curse. The discussion that follows has
built on the insights presented in these earlier review papers with
an explicit intent to reflect on the fragmentation of the literature
along several lines (scale and disciplinary and methodological
approaches). Furthermore, the earlier review papers have paid only
marginal attention to the more micro-scale studies on the impacts
of the extractive industries on local communities. Our intention
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different fragments of the resource curse literature.
3. The macro scale
Economists and other social scientists (e.g. political scientists,
political economy scholars, institutional sociologists, geographers,
etc.) have extensively probed into the macro-level impacts of
mineral resources. Below we discuss the main streams of this
macro-level research depending on the types of impacts and
mechanisms considered (e.g. economic, institutional, etc.).
3.1. The macro scale (macroeconomics)
Economists have largely examined the role of mineral resources
in influencing economic factors that can impact on long-term
economic development. Some earlier development economists in
the 50s and 60s (e.g. see the writings by Lewis, 1955; Innis, 1956;
Rostow, 1960; Watkins, 1963) suggested that resource endow-
ments could potentially alleviate credit constraints and result in
economic expansion. In effect, at the time there was more
anticipation of a resource blessing rather than a curse in terms
of expected macroeconomic impacts – higher transportation costs
made mineral availability seen as a prerequisite of successful
industrial expansion and improvement in living standards. The
majority of economic scholars, though, pointed to a causality of a
different direction. Some economists contested the existence of
positive spillovers from mineral extraction to the rest of the
economy, suggesting that these are likely to be very localised,
particularly in the presence of foreign multinationals (Hirschman,
1958; Baldwin, 1966; for some more recent evidence and
discussion see Veltmeyer, 2013). Prebisch (1950) and Singer
(1950) suggested that the terms of trade of resource-dependent
economies deteriorate over time (i.e. the relative price of primary
commodities vs. manufactured goods falls) which aggravates the
income gap between the resource rich developing countries and
the rest of the world (although the trend has been reversed in
recent years as a result of the mineral commodities boom; see also
the paper by Harvey et al., 2010 that provides evidence in support
of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis over a period of four centuries).
As a consequence of these adverse terms of trade, mineral rich
nations would need to export an increasingly larger amount of
natural resources for any given level of imported manufactured
commodities.
The Dutch Disease theory and its variants subsequently
provided a more sophisticated framework to examine the
macroeconomic effects of mineral abundance on trade patterns,
and thereof on economic growth. In their basic Dutch Disease
model, Corden and Neary (1982) separate the Dutch Disease
mechanism into two effects (see also Corden, 1984). The first,
called the Resource Movement Effect describes the shift of
production factors (capital; labour) from manufacturing and other
productive activities towards the primary sector as a result of
changes in relative marginal productivities. In the case of labour
shifts, this might be less of a concern for developing countries
characterised by large labour surpluses (although skilled labour
might be in shortage; see Ross, 2001 for a discussion). The second,
called the Spending Effect, concentrates on the inflationary
pressures induced as a result of the positive income shock
(triggered by the increase in mineral wealth) that decreases the
competitiveness of commodities outside the primary sector. Both
effects result in a structural transformation that disadvantages the
non-primary tradable sectors. Much of the literature has focused
on the potential contraction of the manufacturing sector and
subsequent repercussions for economic growth, as a result of the
stronger learning-by-doing externalities of the sector (Aizenmanand Lee, 2010; Krugman, 1987; Matsuyama, 1992; Papyrakis,
2011). The overall impact of a Dutch Disease on economic growth
will depend on the relative learning-by-doing and spillover effects
across sectors (see Torvik, 2001). Several country studies have
provided support to the Dutch Disease hypothesis (Papyrakis and
Raveh, 2014 for Canada; Auty and Evia, 2001 for Bolivia, Mikesell,
1997 for Venezuela and Peru; Pegg, 2010 for Botswana; Kutan and
Wyzan, 2005 and Egert and Leonard, 2008 for Kazakhstan).
There are several other macro-scale resource curse theories that
focus on economic variables. For example, it has been shown that
mineral resource abundance is associated with reduced savings
and investment rates, given that capital accumulation becomes
less important for sustaining future income levels (Papyrakis and
Gerlagh, 2006). Gylfason and Zoega (2006) also provide evidence of
a negative link between resource dependence and the rate of
national savings in GDP as well as the maturity of the financial
system (hampering hence a more efficient allocation of capital
across sectors and firms). Any accumulated savings should also be
channelled into the domestic economy to the extent that there is
shortage of physical capital and the economy is far below its full
employment level (Venables, 2010). The macro resource curse may
also be related to a debt overhang, with mineral rich states using
their reserves as collateral for debt in international markets (see
Manzano and Rigobon, 2001; Sarr et al., 2011). Usui (1997) case
study on two oil-rich countries (Indonesia and Mexico) provides
evidence on how such ‘‘boom-based borrowing’’ often results in
debt crises (in 1975 and 1982 in Indonesia and Mexico
respectively). The volatile swings of world resource prices are
also likely to result in a macroeconomic see-saw effect for mineral
rich economies, as well as create uncertainty for domestic and
foreign investors (see van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010). It also
makes it difficult for governments to impose fiscal discipline (due
to the volatility in government revenues; see Auty, 1998). The
direction of causality can go both ways and a prudent fiscal policy
itself is an important shielding mechanism against the degree of
exposure of the domestic economy to an external resource price
shock (Pieschaco´n, 2012). The volatility effect is also likely to be
further accentuated by the lack of diversification in the economy,
both as a result of the aforementioned Dutch Disease effect, as well
as a lack of far-sighted industrial competitive policies (see Auty,
1994; Auty and Pontara, 2008; Murshed and Serino, 2011). The
poor record of mineral-rich economies in terms of diversifying
economic activities and limiting overreliance on primary exports
was already well documented since the late 70s (Eden, 1979;
Kubursi, 1984) – this tendency largely persists today with a few
notable exceptions (e.g. Tunisia, Chile, United Arab Emirates; for a
discussion see Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2014; Gelb, 2010; Wiig and
Kolstad, 2012).
Economists have largely focused on the aforementioned
mechanisms in order to explain the negative observed correlation
between mineral resources and long-term economic growth
(normally over a period of 3–4 decades). There have been several
growth econometrics (cross-country) studies that have explored
the links between minerals and improvements in GDP per capita
over time (e.g. Brunnschweiler, 2008; Murshed and Serino, 2011;
Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; Sachs
and Warner, 2001; Williams, 2011). Some other cross-country
econometric studies linked mineral resources with the observed
variation in income (GDP per capita) levels rather than growth
patterns (Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2008, 2011; Carmignani and
Chowdhury, 2012). A few papers have also focused on broader
human development indicators as the dependent variable of their
econometric analysis. For example, Bulte et al. (2005) concentrate
on the negative correlation between mineral resource abundance
and the Human Development Index (HDI) – in the same study, the
authors also examine how populations in mineral rich states suffer
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undernourishment. Some environmental economists have also
linked mineral wealth to low scores of sustainable development
indicators (such as the genuine savings and genuine income
measurements that calculate net savings and income taking into
account the rate of mineral depletion; see Atkinson, 2003; Dietz
et al., 2007; Neumayer, 2004). It is important to note that the
observed negative correlation between these aforementioned
human development/welfare indicators and resource abundance
holds even when one controls for the level of economic
development (in other words, results are not driven by the GDP
per capita level of mineral-rich economies).
3.2. The macro scale (political economy/institutional analysis)
A large segment of the macro-level resource curse literature
(where other social scientists, e.g. political scientists and
institutional sociologists, have been particularly active) primarily
focuses on the relationship between extractive industries and non-
economic variables. This literature has largely looked at how
mineral resources influence or interact with institutional dimen-
sions (e.g. government efficiency, rule of law, corruption),
democracy and conflict. Below we discuss the different branches
belonging to this literature, although one needs to acknowledge
that often these different streams overlap to some extent.
3.2.1. Institutions (as dependent variable)
Over the last decade, much attention has been drawn to the so-
called institutional explanations of the resource curse. Several
papers suggest that mineral resources hamper the development of
a good institutional framework, e.g. by breeding corruption and
rent-seeking (Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010; Bulte et al., 2005; Isham
et al., 2005; Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Torvik, 2002). Several
papers have associated mineral resources with rent-seeking by
focusing on the role of (mineral-rent distorted) incentives.
Mineral-induced rent-seeking often involves allocating resources
(effort, funds, etc.) on political lobbying to increase one’s share of
existing wealth without creating any added value to the economy
(the term ‘rent-seeking’ was coined by Krueger, 1974). Mineral
wealth is often contested by numerous firms of individuals who
are likely to exert their influence so that they can receive a larger
share of the ‘prize’. For example, mining companies may pay bribes
to governments to receive access to sites and individuals may
attempt to influence governments (e.g. by means of striking,
selective voting, etc.) to redistribute a larger share of public
revenues accruing from mining. A resource boom increases the
incentive to lobby/rent-seek and hence diverts attention and
resources from productive activities (e.g. see the papers by Baland
and Francois, 2000; Boschini et al., 2007; Lane and Tornell, 1999;
Torvik, 2002). Politicians may themselves willingly redistribute
mineral rents in the form of direct transfers, subsidies or public
goods in exchange for electoral support (see Robinson and Torvik,
2005; Vergne, 2009). Of course the extent of rent-seeking depends
on other opportunity costs in the economy (e.g. the return from
other economic activities) and the appropriability of the mineral
rents (e.g. their geographic concentration, number of contestants,
etc.; see Wick and Bulte, 2006; Dejardin, 2011).
Politicians can of course also rent-seek, manipulate institutions
and distort policies, so that they gain direct access to the rents
(Orogun, 2010; Ross, 2001). Overreliance on mineral revenues can
limit good governance; public revenues become inefficiently
allocated (based on rent-seeking rather than expected returns)
often with lower-quality politicians in public office (Brollo et al.,
2013), governments adopt short-sighted policies given the
volatility of prices and revenues and there are limited controls
that encourage transparency and rule of law, limit expropriationand guarantee an efficient bureaucracy (Karl, 1997; Kolstad and
Wiig, 2009; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). There have been several
empirical cross-country analyses (using regression analysis)
demonstrating a strong negative correlation between mineral
resources and several institutional variables (e.g. for corruption,
see Arezki and Bru¨ckner, 2011; Leite and Weidmann, 2002, for rule
of law, see Kolstad, 2009; Norman, 2009; Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian, 2012; for quality of bureaucracy, see Brunnschwei-
ler and Bulte, 2008, Isham et al., 2005; for property rights
protection see Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010; Brunnschweiler, 2008,
for transparency see Williams, 2011).
3.2.2. Institutions (as mediating variable)
The second body of literature on institutions and the resource
curse does not treat institutions as an endogenous variable that is
dependent on the abundance of mineral rents. Rather than trying
to explain any variability in institutions as a result of mineral
abundance, it instead emphasises the mediating role of good
institutions in preventing the resource curse (Boschini et al., 2007;
Kolstad, 2009; Mehlum et al., 2006; Sarmidi et al., 2014). The
preventive role of good institutions against rent-seeking is, for
example, discussed by Tornell and Lane (1999), who show how
weak institutions interacting with a mineral boom can induce a
‘voracity effect’ with numerous interest groups competing for the
rents (see also Boschini et al., 2007 who link the appropriability of
mineral rents, and hence the incentive to rent-seek, on institu-
tional quality proxied by the extent of property rights protection).
Mehlum et al. (2006) also develop theoretical and empirical
models to show how ‘grabber-friendly’ institutions that encourage
corruption constrain growth in a mineral-rich environment. El
Ansashy and Katsaiti (2013) find that low corruption and better
governance improve windfall management leading to higher
growth rates. The core message of the papers belonging to this
substream of the resource curse literature is that sound institu-
tions (e.g. secure property rights, efficient bureaucracies, low
corruption) can turn the ‘resource curse’ into a ‘resource blessing’.
A good institutional framework can naturally benefit the country at
multiple levels; e.g. from the very macro level in terms of
channelling resource rents into productive growth-promoting
investments and shielding against macroeconomic instability (e.g.
Dutch Disease effects) to the very micro level by encouraging
public expenditure management systems that ensure an equitable
distribution of mineral rents, compensation of negatively affected
communities and an improvement of local livelihoods.
3.2.3. Democracy
Several papers have concentrated their attention on a particular
institutional dimension; i.e. the tendency of mineral rents (and oil
in particular) to hinder a transition to democracy. Cross-country
statistical analysis has verified the link between mineral resources
and limited government democratic accountability (Andersen and
Ross, 2014; Aslaksen, 2010; Ross, 2001; Tsui, 2011). Mineral rents
are often misused by authoritarian rulers for the purpose of
prolonging their stay in power (see Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013;
Cuaresma et al., 2010). For example, authoritarian regimes in
mineral-rich states can rely much more on mineral rents than tax
revenues, which correspondingly reduces public demand for
democratic accountability (McFerson, 2010; Ross, 2001, 2009;
see also the book by Jill Crystal (1990) on oil politics in Kuwait and
Qatar). Spending on patronage fuelled by the abundance of mineral
rents may have a similar effect (Auty, 2005; Vandewalle, 1998).
Mineral rents concentrated in the hands of authoritarian rulers
may also suppress democratic aspirations either in the form of
excessive spending in internal security (this is what Michael Ross
(2001) coins the ‘repression effect’; see also Sandbakken, 2006;
Tsui, 2010; Gause, 1995) or obstruction of free information (Dutta
E. Gilberthorpe, E. Papyrakis / The Extractive Industries and Society 2 (2015) 381–390 385and Roy, 2009; Egorov et al., 2009; Williams, 2011). The
appropriability of the mineral rents by the rulers in power (which
for example might increase when mineral industries are nationa-
lised) naturally mediates the resource-democracy relationship
(Ross, 2012; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005). There is also evidence
suggesting that it is the extent of mineral wealth that matters for
democratic accountability rather than any shorter term changes in
mineral affluence (e.g. a short-term income windfall induced by
price fluctuations; see Haber and Menaldo, 2010; Wacziarg, 2012;
Wright et al., 2015; Andersen and Ross, 2014). Some studies have
also treated democracy as a mediating (rather than dependent)
variable upon which the materialisation of resource curse
phenomena depends. For example, Arezki and Bru¨ckner (2010,
2012) find that mineral price booms lead to excessive government
spending and sovereign bond spreads (a measure of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty) in the presence of autocratic rulers.
3.2.4. Conflict
Another important branch of the resource curse literature has
linked the presence of mineral resources with violent conflict.
Several papers have verified a positive relationship between
mineral resources and the onset of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler,
2005; Dixon, 2009; Dunning, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2006;
Welsch, 2008). Some of them have looked at particular types of
resources; e.g. see Le Billon (2008), Lujala et al. (2005), Olsson
(2006, 2007) and Ross (2006) for alluvial diamonds and Lujala et al.
(2007) and Lujala (2010) for oil. The effect is also non-monotonic;
while initial increases in mineral resources raises the probability of
violent conflict, the latter falls for sufficiently high levels of mineral
wealth (possibly via an income stabilising effect; see Collier and
Hoeffler, 1998; Collier et al., 2009).
Several studies suggest that the effect of mineral resources on
conflict is conditional on a range of variables. For example, the
location of the resource might matter. Onshore oil is more
conducive to civil conflict (Lujala, 2010), as is oil extraction in
regions with much lower income per capita than the national
average (Østby et al., 2009). Countries that are more ethnically
homogenous are more likely to avoid conflict in the presence of
mineral resources (Bjorvatn and Naghavi, 2011; Brunnschweiler
and Bulte, 2009; Esteban et al., 2012; Herbst, 2000; Hodler, 2006).
The presence of mineral resources is not only associated with the
onset of conflict but also with its duration (Ballantine, 2003;
Buhaug et al., 2009; Lujala et al., 2005; Fearon, 2004 for the case of
secessionist wars) and severity (e.g. extent of casualties per initial
population).
3.3. Other variables
Finally, some of the macro resource curse literature focuses on
how mineral resources influence some non-economic and non-
institutional variables. Educational measures (such as the share of
public expenditure in GDP or school enrolment rates) have been
found to correlate negatively with proxies of mineral abundance
(Gylfason, 2001a relates this to the fact that extractive industries
are often less human capital intensive; see also Birdsall et al., 2001;
Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Shao and Yang, 2014). Ross (2007)
finds that oil dependence correlates with gender inequality (in the
domain of labour force participation and political representation),
while Daniele (2011) and de Soysa and Gizelis (2013) claim that
mineral rich countries underperform in health indicators (e.g.
proxied by child mortality and HIV infection rates).
4. The meso scale
In the last decade the scale of the resource curse analysis has
also been lowered to an intermediate level, looking at differencesbetween mineral-rich and mineral-poor regions within sovereign
countries. This meso-scale resource curse literature examines
whether some of the aforementioned resource curse mechanisms
found across countries may also hold at the regional level. This
nascent literature has so far provided interesting insights on a
regional resource curse for a wide range of countries. Papyrakis and
Gerlagh (2007), for example, verified that resource-rich US states
lagged behind in long-term growth (as a result of reduced
investment, lower educational attainments and trade openness
and higher corruption; James and Aadland (2011) find similar
evidence at the more disaggregated county level). Zhang et al.
(2008) find similar differences in consumption per capita growth
across Chinese provinces that partly explain the disparities in
living standards observed between coastal and inland regions (see
also Shao and Qi, 2009, for a similar analysis on income per capita
growth). Yuxiang and Chen (2011) further showed that mineral
rich regions in China suffer from a slower pace of financial
development. Papyrakis and Raveh (2014) examined the Dutch
Disease at the regional level across Canadian provinces and found
that mineral-rich provinces suffer from inflationary pressures and
reduced competitiveness. Angrist and Kugler (2008) find that
dependence on coca production and associated rent-seeking
explains differences in the extent of civil conflict across Colombian
regions. Within-region income inequality can also be associated
with regional oil and gas abundance (see the empirical analysis
across Russian regions by Buccellato and Mickiewitz, 2009).
Deaton and Niman (2012) make use of county data from the
Appalachian region to show how mineral dependence increases
poverty rates in the longer term (although it tends to have the
opposite effect in the short term).
Differences between resource rich and resource scarce regions
can also extend to the institutional dimension. Subnational studies
have shown that oil rents assist elected officials to prolong their
stay in power through generous redistribution (irrespective of the
quality of the services they provide; see Goldberg et al., 2008, for
the US and Gervasoni, 2010a, 2010b for Argentina). This is in line
with Paler (2013) who uses experimental data from 1863 villagers
(from the Blora district in Indonesia) to show how resource
windfalls reduce public pressure in terms of holding politicians
accountable for their actions. Libman (2013) finds that mineral
rents encourage economic growth in Russian regions with efficient
and transparent bureaucracies (although not necessarily with
democratic political systems). Similarly, subnational data from
Peru show how bureaucratic capacity can reduce rent-seeking and
prevent localised social conflict in mineral-rich areas (Ponce and
McClintock, 2014). Vicente (2010) provides evidence of a
subnational causal link between perceived corruption and oil
discovery using household data from Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe.
5. The micro scale
In parallel, although quite independently and often quite
covertly (i.e. more often under the banner of ‘development’, see
Weszkalnys, 2010), a separate substream of the resource curse
literature, dominated by anthropologists but also including other
social scientists, has probed into the development impacts of the
extractive industries at the micro or community level. This micro
resource curse literature, as a result of the scholarly prevalence by
non-economists, has examined more closely the broader develop-
ment outcomes and impacts of extractive industries on individual
agency and community relationships, as well as the cultural
characteristics that drive action and determine outcomes. These
studies examine how and why processes of resource extraction
provoke certain kinds of reaction. For example, why is poverty
exacerbated in mineral contexts (e.g. Hilson, 2010, 2012)? How
does mineral wealth stimulate gender inequalities and social
E. Gilberthorpe, E. Papyrakis / The Extractive Industries and Society 2 (2015) 381–390386fragmentation (e.g. Macintyre, 2003)? How do specific social
worlds determine response and action (Banks, 2009)?
There is general agreement within the micro level literature that
the very basic level of cultural difference (based on conflicting and
incompatible social, political and economic forms of organisation)
creates very basic human problems – conflict, social fragmentation
and dislocation, poverty and inequality. Indigenous (or ‘non-
Western’) populations with non-market, transitional or recently
hybridised economic systems of organisation accommodate the
peculiarities associated with mineral extraction in line with their
own social, economic and political idioms. Anthropologists, for
example, have argued that market transactions are, by their very
nature, incompatible with locally embedded systems dominated by
principles of delayed reciprocity and obligation (e.g. Filer, 1990,
1998; Biersack, 1999; Crook, 2007; Golub, 2007; Bainton, 2008).
Unfamiliarity combined with incompatibility can lead to a lack
of engagement with the market structures that ultimately engender
economic growth, and are thus likely to constrain the ability of local
communities to transform their proximity to mineral extraction
into a ‘blessing’. The difference in the organisational character
between a market (mineral-driven) economy and a subsistence/
transitional (rural-based) one can be crucial to understanding how
the activities associated with mineral extraction do or do not benefit
local communities on the one hand, and are interpreted and acted
on by them on the other.
At the heart of the conflict are the principles guiding exchange
and connectivity to place and kin that ensures social and economic
security for all (Gilberthorpe and Sillitoe, 2009), and the imposed
capitalist principles that are individualising, solitary and depen-
dent on colonial principles of state ownership and a hierarchical
structure modelled on principles of core and periphery. This
opposition can generate tensions between the state/corporate
sector and indigenous communities, and can lead to violent and
non-violent conflict (see examples in Watts, 2008; Behrends et al.,
2011; Thorp et al., 2012). On the flip side of this is the opportunities
mineral wealth can provide and the social relationships that
develop as a result of mine occupation. Golub’s 2014 exploration of
gold mining in Papua New Guinea, for example, chronicles in rich
ethnographic detail the individual relationships that evolve out of
local/mine negotiations and the problems that emerge as a result.
Golub’s work highlights the political processes entwined in
resource extraction at the local level and, in so doing, underlines
the forces of inequality, social dislocation and conflict that can
form the basis of a resource curse (see also Watts, 2001; Banks,
2009; Arellano-Yanguas, 2011).
Like Golub, other anthropologists have examined the emerging
political issues accelerated by extractive industries, in particular
social movements and concepts of indigeneity, how these become
politicised and what that means for social fragmentation. Suzanne
Sawyer’s book (2004), for example, chronicles the emergence of
indigenous movements in Ecuador in a stand against multinational
oil companies and the Ecuadorian state (see also Bebbington et al.,
2010). Sawyer and others (Caneiro da Cunha, 2009; Warnaars and
Bebbington, 2014) demonstrate the growing relevance of indi-
geneity in political discourse around national belonging and
ownership of land and resources in extractive industry contexts.
In Latin America in particular, indigenous groups are taking the
process of resource-based development into their own hands and
making demands that fit their own (dynamic) cultural condition.
It is perhaps the covert association in the anthropological
literature with ‘the resource curse’ proper (due to its roots in
economic theory and a greater disciplinary concern with processes
of social change) that separates it theoretically from the macro and
meso level studies discussed above. Yet many of these studies
could make vital contributions to adapting the assumptions
currently embedded in mineral policy (such as the assumptionthat infrastructure and cash are vehicles for development and
conduits of ‘self-development’). The complexities and dynamics of
social organisation and interaction at all levels contribute to the
resource curse; be this in a so-called ‘developing’ country, such as
Papua New Guinea (e.g. Golub, 2014; Gilberthorpe, 2007) or in
what are more often termed ‘developed states’ (see for example
Trigger, 1997, and Langton and Mazel, 2008 for Australia;
Gilberthorpe et al., 2014 for Qatar). Regardless of scale, nuanced
sociocultural factors of kinship, descent and exchange have a
critical influence on local responses to mineral-based development,
but still remain absent from policy planning (Banks, 2009;
Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012).
One particular area where micro level researchers have been
vocal, is in their critiques of extractive industries. Some have
argued that corporate rhetoric of ‘sustainability’ (e.g. ‘sustainable
mining’) and discourses associated with ‘corporate social respon-
sibility’ have been employed by the extractive industries to
legitimise activity, mitigate local concern for bad practice, appease
local hostilities, and ultimately facilitate production in the midst of
environmental devastation and social disruption. Anthropologists
Benson and Kirsch, for example, argue that a rhetoric of
‘sustainability’ is employed to benefit the corporate sector over
and above local communities (Benson and Kirsch, 2010; also
Kirsch, 2010; Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012; O’Faircheallaigh and
Ali, 2008). In a similar vein Rajak (2012) examines ‘corporate
virtue’ (under the banner of corporate social responsibility) as a
condition of late capitalism to show how the merger between
corporate (extractive) activity and development (especially social
development) reproduces a culture of dependency and power in
which the indigenous ‘impacted communities’ remain powerless
players on the periphery of capitalist discourse and contemporary
notions of market discipline (also Gilberthorpe, 2013). The critical
view is perhaps best summed up by Weszkalnys, however, who
sees the resource curse as ‘‘less the invention of economic theorists
or a possible doomed future than a continuation of business-as-
usual under slightly altered rules’’ (2011: 366). Insights such as
these are vital components in our understanding of how (or
whether) a resource curse exists in diverse social, economic and
political contexts.
6. Fragmentation along other lines
It is not only the scale of the analysis and types of impacts/
mechanisms considered that fragment the resource curse litera-
ture. Several other lines of fragmentation exist. Different research
methodologies have been utilised to examine the resource curse
depending on the disciplinary background of the researcher(s).
While it is not surprising that different social scientists adopt a
diverse range of methodological approaches, this naturally
conditions the insights that can be gained. Many economists
and several political scientists (especially those working at the
macro level of the resource curse) apply cross-country regression
analysis to examine the link between mineral resources and some
development outcomes (e.g. economic growth, investment,
institutional quality, conflict, etc.), as well as identify other factors
that mediate this relationship.
The purpose of such a methodological approach is to identify
general trends (i.e. rules of thumb) and broad differences between
mineral rich and scarce nations. Quite often this type of empirical
work aims at testing some predefined theory (e.g. a Dutch Disease,
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, a growth theoretical model, a rent-
seeking conceptual argument, etc.). Several papers even develop
their own theoretical frameworks and then subsequently test them
(e.g. see Mehlum et al., 2006; Olsson, 2007). On the other hand,
anthropologists and some other social scientists typically carry out
qualitative research that does not necessarily aim at testing
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in-depth understanding of particular cases (or comparison of few
of them) – this allows them to extract more detailed case-specific
information on the development effects of the extractive
industries without necessarily striving for a generalisation of
the insights gained (see Golub, 2014; Rajak, 2012). Naturally, both
approaches have merits and should complement each other – in
many cases this is unfortunately not the case. For example, micro-
qualitative evidence should ideally be compared to the more
macro-quantitative evidence with an accompanied critical
reflection in case of a deviation in findings between the two
approaches.
This methodological fragmentation is to a large extent explained
by how (and when) different disciplines engaged with the
‘resource curse’ paradox and its repercussions. Since the seminal
work by Gelb et al. (1988) and Auty (1993), the initial research/
policy question that predominantly attracted attention was the
reasons behind the poor economic performance of mineral-rich
countries and the ill-shaped macroeconomic programmes chosen
by their policy-makers and governments. Naturally, it was the
more macro-level economists, political economy specialists and
political scientists that primarily engaged with this question and
its variants. As a result, the initial methodology employed to
examine the macro-perspective of the resource curse was largely
monopolised by the methodological tools typically used by
economics, political economy and political science (i.e. cross-
country regression analysis, country comparisons, governance
political-economy theories, etc.). This type of analysis also appeals
more to stakeholders (with an interest in the macro-perspective of
the resource curse), since it allows for broader generalisation (and
applicability of findings) and often an easier interpretation,
without the complex specificities that an ethnographic/anthropo-
logical perspective of a community-based resource curse analysis
would entail. Hence, the initial policy and research focus of the
‘resource curse’ on macro-level development impacts and
responses also created (at least at the beginning) less enthusiasm
from other micro-level scholars (often anthropologists and
sociologists, but also micro-development economists) to engage
with the question at the more micro/community level. Gradually
(as it often happens with any nascent research literature) new
research concerns arose that related more closely to the micro-
impacts of mineral-based development on local communities and
their interaction with the state and the extractive sector. This was a
natural evolution of thinking, with scholars with a more micro
focus realising that extractive projects do not only influence the
macro-economy but also produce more localised (social/environ-
mental) effects that directly impact on local communities and their
livelihoods.
As evident from the earlier discussion in this chapter, the
resource curse literature has been fragmented with respect to the
dependent variables it aims to explain (e.g. variation in economic
growth, institutions, democracy, trade, conflict, educational
attainments, health standards, etc.). An aspect that often, though,
receives less attention is the choice of the independent variable that
is meant to capture resource richness or wealth. Since the seminal
work by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), it is customary to
distinguish between ‘resource dependence’ vs. ‘resource abundance’
indices, with the former measuring the value of natural resources
as a share of economic activity (e.g. GDP, exports, etc.) and the
latter in terms of population (or land; i.e. a rather exogenous
variable less likely to be influenced by natural resources should
appear at the denominator). Studies often found that the resource
curse evidence disappears when one uses indices of resource value
in per capita (land) terms rather than as a share of overall economic
activity (e.g. see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Cavalcanti et al.,
2011; Stijns, 2005, 2006).There is also much variation in terms of the type of natural
resources considered. The resource curse literature typically
distinguishes between point and diffuse resources – the former
relate to natural resources that are usually geographically
concentrated and expropriated by a smaller share of the population
(as in the case of mineral resources), while the latter relate to
resources that are more widely dispersed (as in the case of
agriculture). Most scholars nowadays agree that it is typically the
extractive industries (rather than the diffuse resources) that
contribute to resource curse types of phenomena (Bulte et al.,
2005; Isham et al., 2005; Lederman and Maloney, 2007) – although
there is also some evidence of a more localised non-mineral resource
curse, as in the case of cocoa leaf production in Colombia (Angrist
and Kugler, 2008). Earlier studies often failed to look separately at
the differentiated effects of the two types of resources (e.g. see Sachs
and Warner, 1995, 1997; Gylfason et al., 1999; Kronenberg, 2004).
7. Concluding remarks: a need for a multi-scale approach
In this paper we have attempted to exemplify the fragmenta-
tion of research on the resource curse across disciplinary lines and
across different levels of scale. The macro and meso resource curse
literature that focuses on cross-country and cross-regional
comparisons is largely dominated by the work of macroecono-
mists, political economists and political scientists. On the other
hand, the micro resource curse literature that examines the links
between mineral extraction and development at the local level
mainly comprises of the work of anthropologists and other social
scientists.
Multiple reasons justify the need for a unified framework of
analysis that bridges different scales. The macro resource curse
evidence (e.g. in the form of reduced economic growth as a result of
the distortionary impacts of a mineral boom) suggests that, on
average, individuals in a mineral-rich country receive less income
over time. The micro perspective is required in order to grasp how
this macro resource curse burden is distributed (for example, due
to elitism, social disintegration, and corruption). If the resource
curse holds both at the more macro as well as micro level, this
would suggest that local communities in mineral rich areas will be
disproportionately more affected. They are likely to suffer both as a
result of the more general poor macroeconomic performance, as
well as the more localised adverse effects, e.g. in the form of
erosion of social capital or environmental degradation. Naturally,
while the economy might suffer as a whole, and local indigenous
communities may suffer the most, it might not necessarily be the
case that everyone in the economy suffers. If mineral revenues (e.g.
directly or indirectly via redistribution through the public budget)
primarily benefit local urban elites, one needs to design policies
that redistribute financial resources to the local communities in
the mining areas and to understanding how those resources will be
integrated and interpreted. Obviously, this is not always easy to
implement given the intrinsic interests and resistance of the urban
elites to alter the status quo. Perhaps a solution (that could become
more institutionalised) would be for environmental and social
impact assessments to become a standard norm and also
incorporate an analysis on the social dimensions of impacts to
local communities (see Banks, 2013). It is not the aim of this paper
to devise solutions to an issue of such complexity, but rather
explicate the necessity to simultaneously approach the resource
curse within a country from multiple scales.
Keeping sight of the meso scale is also equally important.
Mineral resources are often geographically concentrated and have
the potential to trigger frictions or even civil conflict particularly
for countries that are largely ethnically or religiously fragmented.
A meso resource curse, where mineral rich provinces/regions are
more adversely affected by the resource curse in comparison with
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curse impacts, e.g. in the form of intensified rent-seeking or a
regional Dutch Disease), is likely to create a sense of injustice that
could transform in the long run into political discord, violent
conflict and even economic contraction for the whole country (in
other words, a meso resource curse can set the foundations for a
more macro resource curse). At the more micro level, communities
in mineral rich regions are likely to be affected more, given their
proximity to the contestable resources.
There is an additional reason justifying the need for a more
holistic cross-scale framework of analysis. The scale of fragmenta-
tion of research on the resource curse largely overlaps with a
disciplinary bias. The macro and meso resource curse is mainly
dominated by economists and political scientists, while the micro
resource curse literature mainly comprises of the work of other
social scientists, often with a large anthropological focus. As a
result, the more macro-scale approach has focused more on
economic impacts (e.g. in terms of changes in income per capita)
and the macro institutional environment, while the more micro-
scale work has looked at broader development outcomes that are
often difficult to quantify in a standardised numerical manner (e.g.
effects on community trust and social cohesion). The insights from
all these different disciplinary approaches are naturally invaluable
to understanding how the resource curse might (or might not)
materialise at different levels, as well as how it might spill across
scales. In short, there is a need to approach the resource curse from
a more collaborative interdisciplinary angle, which will permit the
defragmentation of the literature both across scale and disciplinary
lines and foster the development of more socially aware mineral
policy that shows commitment to sound macroeconomic perfor-
mance as well as the safeguarding of social and cultural capital at
the more local level.
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